Europe’s disappointing electricity market reform proposal

Renewable energies can be a powerful source of growth and prosperity. But it must be accompanied by a regulation allowing all consumers to benefit.

Two years of an unprecedented energy crisis have not been enough. It has not been enough that inflation in Europe has exceeded double digits, driven, among others, by the escalation of electricity prices and their translation to the prices of so many other goods and services. It has not been enough that this has contributed to the rise in interest rates by the European Central Bank (ECB), exacerbating the loss of households’ disposable income, making corporate investments more expensive, and devaluing the financial assets on bank balance sheets. It has not been enough that the increase in energy costs has jeopardized the competitiveness of European industry and, with it, the survival of some companies and jobs.

None of this has been enough for the European Commission to react with what would have been the most effective anti-inflationary measure: a pro-competitive reform of electricity markets. Its proposal does not bring anything new to prevent the episodes we have experienced during these years from repeating themselves. Nor does it provide the necessary instruments to address the energy transition in an efficient and equitable manner, allowing consumers to benefit from the lower costs of renewable energies and encouraging electrification as the main way to decarbonize the economy.

To prevent gas prices from contaminating electricity markets during crises, the Commission empowers Member States to regulate electricity prices for households. However, it does not specify how the difference between the price in the wholesale electricity markets – which will continue to be affected by gas prices – and the regulated retail price will be paid. Past and recent experience does not bode well. Minister Rodrigo Rato adopted a similar measure in Spain that resulted in the Electricity Tariff Deficit, almost 30 billion euros that all electricity consumers continue to pay. Similarly, during these two years, Member States, depending on their asymmetrical fiscal capacities, have cushioned the impact of energy costs through public aid. But in both cases, it is the electricity consumers and taxpayers who have ultimately ended up paying.

Regulating final prices does not avoid the problem because it does not tackle its root cause: the over-remuneration of some power generation plants (nuclear, hydroelectric, and renewables) when their production – with low costs, unrelated to gas fluctuations – is remunerated at prices that exceed three to ten times their own costs. Ursula von der Leyen had diagnosed this well in her State of the Union speech (“Low-carbon energy sources are earning enormous revenues they never dreamed of… [and which] do not reflect their production costs“) and so it is disappointing that the Commission’s proposal has ignored this indisputable reality. On the contrary, Member States should have been empowered to limit the remuneration of these plants, especially in cases where – as in Spain – these plants were installed before the implementation of the current electricity market, and for which the regulation always guaranteed the recovery of their costs, as has been indeed the case.

The Commission leaves industrial consumers unprotected, and recommends that they contract electricity at fixed prices to avoid volatility in their energy costs. But it forgets that the main problem is not volatility, but the price level. As it also forgets that it is not that the industry does not want to contract its electricity at stable and competitive prices, but that it is that it does not have the possibility to do so. There are not enough contracts with a long enough duration to cover the industry’s needs, and their prices are not competitive because they continue to reflect the prices of the short-term markets that inevitably are, under current regulation, their underlying reference.

The survival of the European industry depends on its energy costs being competitive. The best way to achieve this is not through subsidies but through an electricity market design that enhances competition. The current proposal offers little hope of mitigating the deindustrialization of Europe.

The Commission is right to preserve short-term markets to promote efficiency in electricity production. It is also right to denounce the lack of long-term contracting that should serve to encourage investment in renewables and the decoupling of electricity prices from gas prices. But it fails in the chosen mechanism: long-term bilateral private contracting between generators and large buyers (industrials or retailers). The Commission wants to encourage this type of contracting in three ways. On the one hand, it requires that Member States ensure the existence of sufficient contractual guarantees, which will require public aid. In addition to being costly for the public budgets, it could give rise to moral hazard problems. It also obliges electricity retailers to forward contract part of their sales, favoring integrated operators over independent operators, ultimately making the price of electricity more expensive for the end consumer. Finally, it proposes that the auctions held by the regulator should favor generators with these contracts, which would distort the efficient choice of renewable investments.

In any case, bilateral private forward contracting is not the solution. Besides being discriminatory against consumers with limited bargaining power -the vast majority-this type of contract does not solve customers’ coverage needs, and its opacity results in less competitive pressure and higher prices.

On the contrary, auctions of long-term contracts with the electricity system as counterparty -such as those held in Spain for investments in renewables- have proven to be effective in providing competitive and stable prices for the benefit of all consumers. Moreover, they give predictability to investments, a key issue for the industry to develop around the deployment of renewables. The Commission’s proposal should have required Member States to hold these auctions to cover a significant fraction of their investments committed through their national energy and climate plans. Not only has it failed to do so, but it recommends that these auctions be used as a last resort when the private bilateral contract market fails.

The electricity sector, hand in hand with the lower costs of renewable energies, can be a powerful source of economic growth and welfare. But it must be accompanied by an electricity regulation that ensures all consumers benefit from it. The choice of inappropriate regulatory instruments, such as those proposed by the Commission, could frustrate this. Just as it could frustrate the flourishing of a European industry around these investments or the avoidance of industry leakage. Finally, it is unacceptable for the Commission to allow electricity companies to benefit from “enormous revenues they never dreamed of” at the expense of European citizens and industry.

Now it is the turn of the European Parliament and the Council. It is their responsibility to redirect a disappointing proposal towards an electricity regulation that is up to the challenges.

Natalia Fabra

Professor of Economics, Carlos III University

This is a translated version of the Tribune published at EL PAIS on March 23, 2023

https://elpais.com/opinion/2023-03-23/europa-decepciona-en-la-cuestion-electrica.html

 


Europa decepciona en la cuestión eléctrica

De la mano de las energías renovables, el sector puede ser una fuente potente de crecimiento y bienestar. Pero tiene que ir acompañado por una regulación que asegure que todos los consumidores se beneficien de ello

Dos años de crisis energética sin precedentes no han sido suficientes. No ha sido suficiente que la inflación en Europa haya superado los dos dígitos, aupada, entre otros, por la escalada de los precios de la electricidad y su traslación a los precios de tantos otros bienes y servicios. No ha sido suficiente que ello haya contribuido a la subida de tipos de interés por parte del Banco Central Europeo (BCE), agudizando la pérdida de renta disponible de los hogares hipotecados, encareciendo las inversiones de las empresas y devaluando los activos financieros en los balances de la banca. No ha sido suficiente que el aumento de los costes energéticos haya puesto en riesgo la competitividad de la industria europea y, con ello, la supervivencia de algunas empresas y puestos de trabajo.

Nada de esto ha sido suficiente para que la Comisión Europea haya reaccionado con la que hubiera sido la medida antiinflacionista más eficaz: una reforma pro-competitiva de los mercados eléctricos. Su propuesta no aporta nada nuevo para evitar que los episodios que hemos vivido durante estos años se repitan. Como tampoco aporta los instrumentos necesarios para abordar la transición energética de forma eficiente y equitativa, permitiendo que los consumidores se beneficien de los menores costes de las energías renovables e incentivando la electrificación como vía principal para descarbonizar la economía.

Para evitar que en situaciones de crisis los precios del gas contaminen los mercados eléctricos, la Comisión habilita a los Estados miembro a regular los precios de la electricidad para los hogares. Sin embargo, no especifica cómo se va a pagar la diferencia entre el precio de los mercados eléctricos —que seguirá afectado por los precios del gas— y el precio regulado. La experiencia pasada y reciente no aporta buenos augurios. En España, el ministro Rodrigo Rato adoptó una medida similar que dio lugar al déficit tarifario, casi 30.000 millones de euros que todos los consumidores eléctricos seguimos pagando. De forma similar, durante estos dos años, los Estados miembro, en función de sus capacidades fiscales asimétricas, han amortiguado el impacto de los costes energéticos a través de ayudas públicas. Pero, en ambos casos, son los consumidores eléctricos y los contribuyentes los que, en última instancia, han acabado pagando.

Regular los precios finales no evita el problema porque no ataja su raíz: la sobrerretribución de algunas centrales de generación eléctrica (nuclear, hidroeléctrica y renovables) cuando su producción —de costes bajos, ajenos a las fluctuaciones del gas— es retribuida a precios que superan de tres a diez veces sus propios costes. Lo había diagnosticado bien Ursula von der Leyen en su discurso del Estado de la Unión (“Las fuentes de energía bajas en carbono están obteniendo ingresos con los que nunca soñaron… [y que] no reflejan sus costes de producción”) y por eso decepciona que la propuesta de la Comisión haya ignorado esa realidad incontestable. Por el contrario, se debía haber habilitado a los Estados miembro a limitar la retribución de estas centrales, máxime cuando en algunos casos —como en España— se trata de centrales previas a la implantación del mercado eléctrico vigente, y a las que la regulación siempre garantizó la recuperación de sus costes, como así ha sido.

La Comisión deja desprotegidos a los consumidores industriales, a quienes recomienda que contraten la electricidad a precios fijos para evitar la volatilidad en sus costes energéticos. Pero olvida que el principal problema no es la volatilidad, sino el nivel de precios. Como olvida también que no es que la industria no quiera contratar su electricidad a precios estables y competitivos, es que no tiene la posibilidad de hacerlo. No hay suficientes contratos a un plazo suficiente para cubrir las necesidades de la industria, y sus precios no son competitivos porque siguen reflejando los precios de los mercados de corto plazo que inevitablemente son, bajo la actual regulación, su referencia subyacente.

La supervivencia de la industria europea depende de que sus costes energéticos sean competitivos. La mejor manera de conseguirlo no es a través de subvenciones, sino a través de un diseño del mercado eléctrico que potencie la competencia. Bajo la propuesta actual, difícilmente se evitará la desindustrialización de Europa.

La Comisión acierta al preservar los mercados a corto plazo para promover la eficiencia en la producción eléctrica. También acierta al denunciar la falta de contratación a largo plazo que debería servir para fomentar las inversiones en renovables y el desacople de los precios de la electricidad de los del gas. Pero falla en el mecanismo elegido: la contratación bilateral privada a largo plazo entre generadores y grandes compradores (industriales o comercializadores). La Comisión quiere favorecer este tipo de contratos por tres vías. Por una parte, pide que existan garantías contractuales suficientes, lo que exigirá ayudas públicas que además de ser onerosas para las arcas públicas, podrían dar lugar a problemas de riesgo moral. También obliga a las comercializadoras de electricidad a contratar a plazo parte de sus ventas, favoreciendo a los operadores integrados frente a los comercializadores independientes, y encareciendo el precio de la electricidad para el consumidor final. Y, por último, propone que en las subastas que realice el regulador se favorezca a los generadores con energía contratada a plazo, lo que distorsionaría la elección eficiente de las inversiones en renovables.

En cualquier caso, la contratación bilateral privada a plazo no es la solución. Este tipo de mercados, además de ser discriminatorios con los consumidores sin capacidad de negociación —la inmensa mayoría—, no solucionan las necesidades de cobertura de los clientes, y su opacidad se traduce en una menor presión competitiva y mayores precios.

Por el contrario, las subastas de contratos a largo plazo con el sistema eléctrico como contraparte —como las celebradas en España para las inversiones en renovables— han demostrado ser eficaces para aportar precios competitivos y estables en beneficio de todos los consumidores. Además, dan predictibilidad a las inversiones, cuestión fundamental para que se desarrolle la industria en torno al despliegue de las renovables. La propuesta de la Comisión debía haber exigido a los Estados miembro celebrar estas subastas para cubrir una fracción significativa sus inversiones comprometidas en sus planes nacionales de energía y clima. Y no sólo no lo ha hecho, sino que recomienda que estas subastas se utilicen como un último recurso cuando el mercado de contratos bilaterales privados falle.

El sector eléctrico, de la mano de las energías renovables y de sus menores costes, puede ser una fuente potente de crecimiento económico y bienestar. Pero tiene que ir acompañado por una regulación eléctrica que asegure que todos los consumidores se beneficien de ello. La elección de instrumentos regulatorios inadecuados, como los que propone la Comisión, podría frustrarlo. Como también podría frustrar el que florezca una industria europea en torno a estas inversiones, o el que se evite la fuga de la industria. Por último, no es admisible que la Comisión consienta que la regulación eléctrica ampare rentabilidades con las que las empresas eléctricas “nunca soñaron”, a expensas de los ciudadanos y de la industria europea.

Ahora es el turno del Parlamento Europeo y del Consejo. Reconducir una propuesta decepcionante hacia una regulación eléctrica a la altura de los retos es su responsabilidad.

The European Commision´s proposal to reform electricity markets

Europe has faced – and still faces – an unprecedented energy crisis that has translated into record-high gas and electricity prices (Figure 1). These prices have further propagated throughout the European economy, as evidenced by the spike in inflation and core inflation in Europe (Verwey and Dieckmann 2023). In response to the energy crisis, which was particularly severe during the summer of 2022, Ursula von der Leyen announced that the European Commission would work on “a deep and comprehensive reform of the electricity market” (for a discussion of the announcement at the time, see Fabra 2022). Almost half a year later, the Commission is about to disclose its proposed reform. However, some public statements (for example, by the European Commission Director of Green Transition and Energy System Integration at the European Parliament on 7 March) and leaks of the proposal allow for a preliminary assessment of the (supposedly) key elements of the reform.

Figure 1 Evolution of wholesale gas and electricity prices in Europe

(a) Wholesale electricity prices

 

(b) Wholesale gas prices

Sources: Red Eléctrica; MIBGAS, investing.com

In this column, we summarise the key elements of the European Commission’s leaked proposal through the lens of our submission to the public consultation that was launched by the Commission in preparation for the reform. Our submission, jointly co-authored by a group of European economists, is now available as a CEPR Policy Insight (Ambec et al. 2023).

The European Commission’s proposal for an electricity market reform

The primary goal of the Commission’s proposed electricity market reform is to reduce the price volatility faced by electricity consumers and investors – surprisingly, the goal of achieving competitive prices only appears as a byproduct. To achieve stable prices, the Commission proposes preserving short-run electricity markets while promoting private bilateral mechanisms for long-term contracting and fixed-price retail contracts under the condition that energy suppliers are sufficiently hedged. And in case of emergencies, the Commission proposes to decouple electricity bills from short-run prices by capping the retail price for a fixed volume of energy – yet the Commission does not clarify who will pay for the difference.

Agreements…

Our views coincide with the Commission’s proposal in some respects but depart from it in other fundamental ways. In our submission, and in line with the Commission’s proposal, we advocated for preserving short-run electricity markets, which are instrumental in achieving productive efficiency and guiding efficient consumption decisions. However, we also argued that reliance on short-run markets alone is inadequate as their prices are overly volatile, do not reflect the average costs of the various generation technologies, and fail to provide efficient market signals for long-run investments on the supply side (e.g. investments in renewable energies) and on the demand side (e.g. investments in electrification by industry). It is important to keep in mind that the objective should not only be to decarbonise the power sector but the economy as a whole. However, without competitive and stable electricity price levels, the industry will be discouraged from electrifying its production process, which is the most effective tool for carbon abatement. Therefore, we believe that a pillar of electricity market design should be the development of healthy long-run contracting arrangements capable of addressing those concerns.

… and disagreements

However, our proposal differs from the Commission’s on the best mechanisms to achieve sufficient and competitive long-term contracting. In particular, we are sceptical of the Commission’s emphasis on private bilateral contracting through so-called power purchase agreements (PPAs). While PPAs have allowed for a first round of investments, it is unlikely that they will deliver the scale of renewable energy investments at the speed needed to achieve the energy security and climate objectives agreed upon at the EU and Member State levels.

One of the key reasons is that PPAs are subject to large counterparty risks, given that the off-takers will have strong incentives to renege from these contracts once the short-run electricity market prices fall, as is expected (Figure 2). In order to mitigate these risks and promote the PPA market, the Commission proposes that Member States provide public guarantee schemes through state aid. In our submission, we warned against this policy as it will put large amounts of public money at risk while giving rise to moral hazard problems and gaming opportunities on the side of the off-takers. Equally worrying is a proposal for a minimum share of PPAs to be signed by retail companies, which would make their demand for PPAS price-inelastic, further strengthening the bargaining power of the generators. As argued below, regulatory-defined purchases should be implemented through transparent procurement processes and products, for example through public tenders.

Figure 2 Evolution of futures electricity prices in Spain, France, and Germany

Source: OMIP

Furthermore, we are concerned about the competitive implications of PPAs. Markets for PPAs are not frictionless or transparent, which contributes to weakening competition and raising barriers to entry for new players. Furthermore, electricity generators commonly stand at stronger bargaining positions vis-à-vis the buyers, giving rise to prices that exceed the generation costs while providing an inadequate hedge for the buyers’ consumption profiles. This is particularly worrisome in the case of smaller actors, for whom reliance on PPAs puts them in a disadvantaged position relative to the larger players. Furthermore, when energy retailers sign PPAs, there is no guarantee that PPA prices will be passed on to the final end-users – a concern that is founded on the evidence of weak competitive pressure in retail energy markets.

A boost for regulatory-backed auctions for long-term contracts

Instead, we propose to boost the use of regulatory-backed auctions of long-term contracts for differences (CfDs). We argued that only this tool could ensure a sufficient scale of long-term contracts to offer a credible investment perspective for the required volumes of renewable energy projects. In turn, this is essential to unlocking the investments into an EU supply chain of renewable energies’ manufacturing capacity. A CfD model has already been successfully implemented in various EU countries, achieving significant reductions in financing costs for project developers, thus allowing energy consumers to reap large reductions in the price of renewables.

CfDs can be pooled and then passed on to final consumers (or retail companies on their behalf) in ways that do not distort the short-run price signals or retail competition. Thus, consumers are hedged against wholesale price volatility while benefiting from attractive renewable prices. Consumers, or retailers on their behalf, are thus encouraged to hedge the gap between the renewable production and their demand profiles, thus unlocking flexibility and catalysing suitable forward markets.

Despite all the benefits and opportunities that CfDs offer European consumers, the leaked Commission proposal views CfDs almost as a tool of last resort. The prevalence of PPAs over CfDs advocated by the Commission is so strong that they even propose to distort these auctions for CfDs by giving preference to bidders that have signed a PPA for part of the project’s generation. This can have adverse consequences on the auction performance and the relative efficiency of the winning projects. It is nevertheless positive that the Commission advocates for the use of two-way CfDs, which hedge both producers and consumers, instead of one-way CfDs, which only protect the former.

Limiting the excessive profits of inframarginal generators

Last, we also depart from the European Commission proposal in its decision to phase out measures to limit the revenues of the existing inframarginal generators (nuclear, hydro, and renewables), i.e. the possibility to limit the revenues of these technologies at a maximum of €180/MWh. This decision is surprising: the text reckons these plants have consistently made record-high profits, given that their costs (Figure 3) are well below the prices negotiated in the short-run electricity markets (Figure 1). However, the Commission’s proposal does not comprise any option to stop this from repeating itself at the expense of European consumers.

On the contrary, in our Policy Insight we argue in favour of maintaining a mechanism to address such windfall profits as a coordination success among Member States in moments of critical tension. Given the possibility that the market will experience extreme conditions in the future, and the challenges experienced will repeat, it is best to retain a pre-defined safety valve that will partly avoid the turmoil observed during the energy crisis, during which governments had to make quick decisions to limit the burden of energy costs to businesses and households while assuming substantial debt. Furthermore, we see no compelling reason why legacy technologies, such as large hydro projects and nuclear plants built prior to liberalisation under regulatory-backed risk-free decisions, should be allowed to reap windfall profits while causing huge societal costs.

Figure 3 Average costs of electricity generation

Source: International Energy Agency (projected costs for 2020)

Conclusions

We believe that Europe’s industry and households cannot afford to pay high and volatile electricity prices much longer, and we remain sceptical as to whether the European Commission’s proposal will do much to address these concerns. The proposal does not mitigate the risk that episodes of sustained high prices, like those seen during the summer and autumn of 2022, might repeat during 2023/2024. Nor does the proposal offer a much-needed perspective to industry and households on how they can benefit from the cost reductions of renewable energy technologies. Limiting the electricity reform to cosmetics would be a lost opportunity to tame the fears of European deindustrialisation while pushing the European ambition in the green battle.

After all, it does not seem that the Commission’s proposal will be as deep and comprehensive as Ursula von der Leyen had initially announced – unless the European Parliament and the Council do something to avoid the plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose

This article was published at VoxEU on March 9, 2023

Antitrust, Regulation & the Political Economy

The conference Antitrust, Regulation & Political Economy took place in Brussels last March 2, 2023. Chaired by Cristina Caffara, the conference joined leaders from academia, government, and antitrust agencies to discuss the challenges facing policymaking and antitrust enforcement today.

Natalia Fabra participated in the session “Market Power in a Post-Neoliberal World”, together with Dani Rodrik (Harvard), Luigi Zingales (Chicago), Silvana Tenreyro (LSE), Thomas Philippon (NYU), John van den Reenen (LSE), Jan Eeckhout (UPF).

The video of this session is available here.

The program and more information about the conference is available here.

Entrevista en La Noche 24h

El pasado 29 de enero de 2023, el periodista Xabier Fortes entrevistó a Natalia Fabra en el programa de RTVE La Noche 24h.
El tema de la entrevista versó en torno a la Cumbre Hispano-Francesa, el proyecto del Barmar y el hidrógeno verde, entre otras cuestiones.
Puedes ver la entrevista en este link a partir del minuto 21:40.